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GREAT SERVICE SECRETARIES  
- LESSONS LEARNED -

BY

Mr. Van B. Cunningham  
Department of Army Civilian

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
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### GREAT SERVICE SECRETARIES: LESSONS LEARNED

#### AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Van B. Cunningham  
Department of the Army Civilian

Colonel William G. Eckhardt  
Project Adviser

U.S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013



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## Table of Contents

Table of contents	i
Prologue	ii
Abstract	iii
Acknowledgement	iv
George Washington's War Office	1
Secretary of War Elihu Root	3
Twelve Lessons Learned from Secretary Root	12
Secretary of the Army Frank Pace	13
Secretary Pace's View of the Secretary's Role	15
Twelve Lessons Learned from Secretary Pace	20
Establishment of the War Department	21
Learning from the Corporate Director	23
Twelve Lessons Learned from Corporate Governance	26
Civilian Control of the Military	28
Three Guiding Principles for the U.S. Military	30
Evolution of the Role of the Service Secretary	34
The Detractors	37
Operational Issues	39
Problems of the Nunn/Warner Reorganization Act	41
Secretary McNamara's Fast Start	45
Conclusion	46
Appendix A: Corporate Directors Lessons Learned	48
Appendix B: Legislative Requirements of the Secretary of the Army	51
Appendix C: Telephonic interview with former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara	53
Appendix D: Extract from JCS Pub 4-0	54
Appendix E: Other Studies on the Role of the Service Secretary	55
Endnotes	57
Bibliography	65

## Prologue

This paper develops ideas to help a new Service Secretary 'spin up' rapidly, to hit the ground running. If time is short, the reader should read the guiding principles section, the three Lessons Learned sections, and the Fast Start section. When more time is available, the full sections on Secretaries Root and Pace offer important returns. Finally, read the entire paper. Further study might include the other studies listed in Appendix E.

The paper grew from research into Secretary Pace's life, after the author received a Pace Award. The research trail led to Secretary Root. The literature on the role of the Service Secretary wrangled issues that the author had seen solved over ten years before in the field of corporate governance. That field matured during the seventies and eighties. The perils of failure to govern the corporation well became apparent about a year after the author's extensive interview with the corporate secretary of Braniff Airlines. The airline failed for foreseeable reasons. Companies like Texas Instruments, Inc. however, governed wisely, grew and prospered.

### **Abstract**

This paper is designed to help a new Service Secretary during the difficult transition period. It is based on the lives of two great men, Secretary of War Elihu Root and Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., who made extraordinary contributions to the Army. Twelve lessons learned are drawn from each man's experience. Because of the similarity of issues surrounding the role of the Service Secretary and the role of the corporate director, twelve lessons are drawn from business corporate governance. Three guiding principles for governance of the military are offered. Several contemporary issues: civilian control of the military, evolution of the Secretary's role, and several detractors are discussed. Exclusion of the Service Secretary from operational matters is challenged. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's amazing fast start is explained.

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## **George Washington's War Office**

George Washington created the War Office in 1776:

"The benefits derived from it [the War Office], I flatter myself will be considerable tho' the plan upon which it is first formed may not be perfect. This like other great works in its first Edition, may not be entirely free from Error. Time will discover its Defects and experience suggest the Remedy, and such further Improvements as may be necessary; but it was right to give it a Beginning."<sup>1 2</sup>

Since that time, the position has changed significantly.

Living up to George Washington's expectations, two successors to that position, Secretary of War Elihu Root and Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., made extraordinary contributions to the Army and their Nation. The thesis of this paper is that their experiences provide excellent lessons learned for future Secretaries. Leaving the role of leader and manager to others, both men practiced wise governance.

### **The Challenge Facing Today's Service Secretary**

The Army Budget Summary Total Obligation Authority (TOA) for 1991 was \$73.0 billion.<sup>3</sup> Compared with the Fortune 500 corporations, on the basis of revenues, this places the Army larger than 497 of the 500 largest U.S. industrial corporations.<sup>4</sup> In 1983, Secretary of the Army John Marsh pointed out that the [Total] Army was larger than the total of "General Motors, General Electric, Xerox, Woolworth, Exxon, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, and RCA."<sup>5</sup> Even without the complexity of each service, successful leadership of an armed service is a huge challenge.



Many Service Secretaries have met great challenges: Secretary Root recognized and built the Total Army and Secretary Stimson recommended dropping the first two nuclear bombs. One secretary was killed in the line of duty,<sup>6</sup> and another was personally involved in a Civil War battle.<sup>7</sup>

Creation of the Department of Defense clearly changed the role of the Service Secretary. While it is natural to think our problems are new and unique, many old problems of these two great Secretaries still plague us, or plague us again. Fortunately, there are volumes of history on Root's work. Many of Frank Pace's views on his role as Secretary have been documented in the Senior Officer Oral History Program, of the U.S. Military History Institute. Together, their experiences provide a comprehensive view to this daunting office.

By law, the Secretary of the Army is now to be appointed from civilian life by the President. This paper is intended to offer some historical background for a new Secretary during the dynamic, but difficult transition period. The following accounts of the two great secretaries are intended to offer the reader a discrete picture of each man. A broader discussion of governance in large organizations and modern issues relating to the Service Secretary follows the individual sketches.

### Secretary of War Elihu Root

The father of Elihu Root's maternal grandfather was John Buttrick, the American commander at the bridge in Concord Massachusetts on April 19, 1775, who ordered the "shot heard 'round the world."<sup>8</sup> Spending much time with this grandfather, he learned a hundred family stories of the Revolutionary War period, instead of fairy tales. His mother related a strong Colonist distaste for the Hessians, but not particularly for the British.

Elihu Root was born to Professor Oren and Nancy Root, at Clinton, New York, on February 15, 1845: "A comic Valentine delayed in the mail," (he called himself). Named after his grandfather, the name had always been pronounced "El'-i-hu" in the Root family, not as biblical scholars have described. Also, "Root" rhymed with "boot," not "foot."<sup>9</sup>

In 1849, Professor Oren Root was hired by Hamilton College, to be Professor of "Mathematics, Astronomy, Mineralogy, Conchology, Botany, Geology, and Civil Engineering."<sup>10</sup> A German astronomer, Christian Peters, who boarded with the Roots for the eight years before Elihu left home at twenty, as well as others, constantly challenged and therefore inspired young Elihu. Over the dinner table, Elihu learned to discuss rigorously a broad range of intellectual subjects. Biographer Jessup noted: "Subconsciously he grew up with the idea that science was the most important thing in life."<sup>11</sup>

The young Elihu was quick to learn, although his older brother was shocked that Elihu had not been accepted at college at fourteen. After heavy preparation, young Root entered Hamilton College at sixteen in 1860.<sup>12</sup>

Elihu became an accomplished public speaker. At graduation on July 21, 1864, Phi Beta Kappa Elihu Root, then nineteen and a half years old, presented his: "Valedictory Oration - Conservatism and Radicalism in Education." A reporter wrote: "Mr. Root's is an analytical, pains-taking, far-reaching intellect, which will cut a deep furrow in life if we mistake not."<sup>13</sup>

After graduation, Root moved to New York City. Drawing upon his strong educational foundation, he taught school to pay his way through New York University Law School. He completed the two year Bachelor of Laws degree program in 1867, although most of his classmates took advantage of the opportunity to take the bar exam after the first year; he had gone to New York to complete the program. He was admitted to the Bar on June 18, 1867.<sup>14</sup>

As Root's legal career progressed, he incurred the wrath of William Randolph Hearst for being a junior lawyer on the legal team defending Boss Tweed. His view is shown in his speech to the graduating class of the Columbia University Law School:

**"You must support the law even when in particular cases its justice seems doubtful. The inviolability of constitutional**

**and statutory rights are more valuable than the punishment of any one criminal... No matter how vile the criminal, if he represents a constitutional right, you will do your country a service by defending him."**<sup>15</sup>

Root was admitted to the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States on November 14, 1881. The Delmonico case, his case before the Supreme Court, was settled before it could be called for argument.

Root's corporate law career prospered over the next eighteen years. An experience which influenced Root was the move of his partner and cousin, Robert Strahan to the New York Assembly and later the State Senate. After some soul searching, Root decided:

**"It ruined him as a lawyer... I came to the conclusion that I would be a lawyer first and all the time. I decided to adjure politics except as it might be my duty to participate."**<sup>16</sup>

Root detailed his views to Henry Morgenthau in 1896:

**"It is unwise for any lawyer to devote himself entirely to politics, ... He should, when called upon, render public service, complete it, and then return to his profession, but be ready for any further calls that might be made upon him."**<sup>17</sup>

Considering his strong belief in a citizen's duty, Root was appalled at the sentiment of the times, when he gave the Commencement address at Hamilton College in June 1879.

**"The disease is political degeneracy... The evil which makes all other evils possible, the most alarming symptom in a constitutional government, the most fatal malady by which a free people can be attacked, is a withdrawal of good citizens from the exercise of governmental duties and the indifference to political affairs. I look with alarm upon the growth of this tendency in this country."**<sup>18</sup>

Without holding elective office, Root became a prominent Republican in New York. A close friend of Chester Arthur, he was with the Vice President, on September 19, 1881, when word came that President Garfield had just died. Root and a friend brought the judge that swore in Arthur as the twenty-first President. (Twenty years later, Secretary of War Root organized the swearing in ceremony for President Theodore Roosevelt, when President McKinley also died of assassination.) President Arthur knew of Root's disdain for public office and did not offer him one.

To solve a number of problems, President William McKinley asked Elihu Root, 54, to be his new Secretary of War on July 21, 1899. Assured that the President wanted Root not for his military knowledge but for his legal talents, to deal with the new colonies won at the end of the Spanish-American War. Root finally accepted, after first declining.<sup>19</sup> He was sworn in on August 1, 1899.

In his biography, Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition, Northwestern Professor Richard Leopold described Root:

"He had extraordinary talent for finding workable solutions to technical and complex problems. His integrity was unchallenged, his capacity for sustained labor unlimited, his deftness in placating suspicious legislators unexcelled, and his Republican orthodoxy unimpeachable."<sup>20</sup>

"He brought to the task a keen, logical incisive mind that went quickly to the heart of the matters. His own tireless industry and devotion to duty inspired warm affection and the best efforts from his subordinates."<sup>21</sup>

"He had, moreover, the ability few citizens possessed to understand the thinking of and to maintain the unqualified respect of the professional soldier."<sup>22</sup>

After solving the colonial problems Root set out to solve the problems he saw in the Army. His program included:

1. Manpower - For the twenty years before the Cuban crisis, the Army never exceeded 28,000 officers and men. This was raised to 275,000 regulars and volunteers during the Spanish-American War.

"In seeking to determine a reasonable size for the peacetime army, Root made it clear that the nation could not return to prewar levels. A force of 28,000, he pointed out in November 1900, would, in view of the Nation's growth, be proportionately only a third of what had prevailed in 1870. He asked, therefore, and obtained in February 1901 a minimum of about 60,000 enlisted men and a maximum of 100,000."<sup>23</sup>

2. After two years work, Root received permission from Congress in February 1901 to have officers temporarily assigned to the headquarters in Washington, rather than permanent assignments. Soon, officers were detailed to Washington for four to five years, followed by at least a twelve month return to troop duty. To insure that duty matched qualifications, assignments should be based on work at special service schools or at the new war college.<sup>24</sup>

3. The service school system was to be overhauled, and a new Army War College was to be initiated. The Navy had a postgraduate school at Newport, Rhode Island since 1884. On November 27, 1901, Root signed an order creating the Army

War College in Washington. The new school would provide oversight of all military instruction, would offer courses in planning and strategy, and would advise the Commander in Chief on many subjects. The special service schools, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers, were expanded and opened to officers of the National Guard, former members of the volunteers, and graduates of the private military colleges.<sup>25</sup>

4. Root's understanding of the Total Army was his outstanding legacy. He was committed to the responsibility of citizens to public service. Although he believed that the militia should be based on every able bodied male citizen, he recognized that this would not work. He was determined to revitalize the militia system, which had not had new legislation since 1792. He decided the group of state organizations, the National Guard, would be his federal militia. With a little assistance, he personally drafted the Militia Act of 1903 and sent it to friends in Congress.

**"The fundamental idea of this law is to recognize the activity of the National Guard; to utilize that as the constitutional militia of the country; to utilize it as the great school of the volunteer soldier; to make it a part of the military establishment of the United States; to lay down the lines of activity so that the regular army and the National Guard shall work together, and grow ever closer and closer together, knit in bonds of sympathy and brotherhood, preparing for a great struggle in a common cause."**<sup>26</sup>

He recommended that state units should have the same

organization, equipment, and discipline as the regulars. The regulars were to specialize in those branches of warfare requiring the most extensive and technical preparation. He proposed joint exercises to be paid for by the War Department. He proposed reserve strength be set between 250,000 and 300,000. Finally, Congress declared the National Guard to be the organized militia, on January 21, 1903. Subsequently, Congress appropriated \$2,000,000 to support Root's changes on March 2, 1903.<sup>27</sup>

By legitimizing the National Guard, Root had settled a militia problem that had existed for over 100 years, in light of the Constitution. To the Interstate National Guard Association convention, he pointed out:

**"I wish to call your attention to the provision of the Constitution, in the tenth section of the first article, that 'no state shall without the consent of Congress,... keep troops or ships of war in time of peace,' and I congratulate the National Guard upon being now, probably for the first time, unquestionably a constitutional force."**<sup>28</sup>

5. Root's created a capable General Staff. According to the Secretary of War during World War I, Newton D. Baker, **"[it] was not his outstanding contribution to the national defense of the country, but the outstanding contribution made by a Secretary of War from the beginning of history."**<sup>29</sup>

Root believed in two cardinal principles: civilian supremacy and power with responsibility. It troubled him that no one in the military had responsibility to study strategy and logistics. In March, 1902, he told the Senate:



**"Neither law nor custom places the preparation of plans for national defense in the hands of any particular officer or body of officers, and what is everybody's business is nobody's business."**<sup>30</sup>

Under Root's plan, the title of "Commanding General" would be retired when the incumbent retired in August 1903.

Subsequently, orders would be issued in the name of the Secretary of War through an officer called the "Chief of Staff." His primary duties would include: preparing plans for national defense, maintaining readiness, insuring speedy mobilization, and advising the secretary on military matters. He was to be supported by a staff of 40-50 officers, to be called the General Staff Corps, in grade of captain through general, detailed from the line for four years.<sup>31</sup>

Secretary of War Elihu Root can also be credited with understanding the need for "the joint arena." In 1903, he and Secretary of the Navy William Moody formed the Joint Army and Navy Board, to deal with matters of interest to both departments. The new board suffered from some shortcomings, later remedied. The board members all had other primary duties. The board lacked its own staff and the power to set its own agenda.<sup>32</sup> In spite of the problems an enduring concept was born.

There is a little known footnote to history about Elihu Root. Since coming to Washington in 1899, Root had grown in public stature. In December 1899, he declined the offer to

run as Vice President on the 1900 Republican ticket.

Otherwise, with the assassination of President McKinley, he would have become president instead of Teddy Roosevelt.<sup>33</sup>

### **Twelve Lessons Learned from Secretary Elihu Root**

1. You must support the law even when in particular cases its justice seems doubtful. The inviolability of the U. S. Constitution and statutory rights are more valuable than the punishment of any one criminal.
2. Private citizens have a responsibility to perform governmental duties when called or recalled.
3. Your integrity must be unquestioned.
4. Civilian supremacy and power with responsibility are cardinal principles.
5. Make an effort to placate suspicious legislators.
6. Your industry and devotion to duty inspire the best efforts from subordinates.
7. Respect the American soldier. You should respect and understand the thinking of the professional soldier, and therefore maintain the respect of the professional soldier.
8. A rationally sized, stable, peacetime Army, related to U.S. population, is important.
9. The Total Army needs to be organized and trained, individually and in units, as the regulars.
10. A vital, responsive Army General Staff is important.
11. A comprehensive service school system must glean and teach lessons learned in war to the Total Army. The military should especially study strategy and logistics.
12. A joint organization, across services is important.

### **Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr.**

Frank Pace, Jr.'s mother had been president of a bank in Yellville, Arkansas. His father was in a law partnership with Senator Jefferson Davis, in Little Rock, Arkansas. An only child, Frank was precocious; he graduated from high school at fourteen, and was accepted by Harvard University. His mother thought that was too young for college, so Frank attended two years of prep school before going on to Princeton University and Harvard Law School.<sup>34</sup>

Public service appealed to Pace, so much that he served three months as Assistant District Attorney for the State of Arkansas without pay. His father kidded him that, for once, he had been paid what he was worth.<sup>35</sup>

With the advent of World War II, Pace was commissioned from OCS at Miami Beach and served with the Air Transport Command, of the Army Air Corps. He was promoted to the rank of major before the war ended. From his background, he brought to public service strong self-confidence:

"I always had... a clear sense of whatever the problem was, I could handle it."<sup>36</sup>

After campaigning for Senators McClellan and Fulbright, Pace went to Washington. He worked in the Office of the Budget, and eventually became the Director of the Budget. The Secretary of the U.S. Senate was a great admirer of Frank Pace, Sr., and invited young Pace to inner circles of the Senate to which few outsiders would have had access.

From his time campaigning, Pace had learned what elected officials had to go through to get elected. For that reason, he always treated members of Congress with great, genuine respect. He learned how Congress worked. Further, he gained a good rapport with Congress, which President Truman respected.

Pace was one of the group of people who helped President Truman institutionalize the Office of the President. He worked on the creation of the National Security Council. At that time, there was considerable debate over whether the N.S.C. would foster true integration of thinking or just be a vehicle of relatively meaningless discussions. Pace supported the first view.

In May 1950, President Truman appointed Pace, 37, to be Secretary of the Army. Secretary Pace later said:

**"The President probably felt that the biggest contribution a Secretary of the Army could make was organizational capacity and leadership... He also knew that he had dealt with me long enough so that he could trust my judgement, integrity, and my loyalty to the President."**<sup>37</sup>

The importance President Truman placed on the young Secretary's counsel was shown when North Korea invaded South Korea. A meeting was called at Blair House.

**"[President Truman] asked each of us to comment on our feeling as to what we should do, why we should do it, and what was the status of United States capacity to act effectively."**<sup>38</sup>

On June 27, 1950, President Truman announced his decision to order U.S. air and naval forces to support the

South Korean troops. Secretary Pace continued to play a key role in the Korean War. It was Secretary Pace who later personally delivered President Truman's relief order to General MacArthur.

### **Secretary Pace's View of the Secretary's Role**

Early as the new Secretary of the Army, Pace decided his view of the role of the Service Secretary:

"You had to sit down at the start, you see, and pretty well determine what it is that your role should be as Secretary of the Army. Are you going to run the Army, or are you going to play a role in seeing that the army is well run? ... I came to the conclusion the latter was my function. First, the mechanism being primarily military, I did not feel that even if I had the background and knowledge that I could, or should run the Army. I felt that where basic non-military decisions or even large military decisions were made, the military should consult me, and they never failed to."<sup>39</sup>

Pace expanded his view of the managerial requirements of the Army leadership:

"It is the essence of great management to create a system that separates the 'doable' from the 'non-doable.' The capacity to generate great ideas is not really unique. The capacity to generate those that are workable is really unique, [as is] the capacity to take the ones that are workable and make them work. This is the essence of management. I have felt that somewhere in the military system is needed a better seine or sieve to insure that we do identify what is workable and what is not workable, and that we do organize to make what is workable, work."<sup>40</sup>

After being appointed Secretary of the Army, Secretary Pace went to talk to the previous Secretaries, Robert Patterson, Kenneth Royall, and Henry Stimson. Secretary Stimson was very pleased to be consulted; he arranged to

have General Eisenhower brief him the day before Pace's arrival. Pace's travels were rewarding:

"And not only did I learn something, but I also had the good will and support of men who had previously been there, and to me it was a very rewarding experience and one I think could well be practiced by later Secretaries of the Army."<sup>41</sup>

One of the first things that struck Secretary Pace was the size of the Army.

"When you consider first the size of the Army, that automatically identifies its major difficulty in establishing sound managerial principles... Big is beautiful, but it isn't the best way to achieve excellence."<sup>42</sup>

The area that Secretary Pace felt needed the most help was the Army's image:

"... in my estimation, the Army's public posture was totally unacceptable... And so, one of the primary functions of the civilian general counsel was this: I felt that the Army's failure to expose its own errors was a great fault and so I said that I wanted identification of those things that had happened, that could result in very bad publicity for the Army. I wanted to know about them in advance. If there was fault, it had to be punished, but the fact that it was identified in advance would be a major mitigating circumstance in my mind."<sup>43</sup>

With his understanding of Congress, he created a very effective damage control approach in the civilian General Counsel:

"I then sent my civilian general counsel to the related committee of Congress and said: here is a situation that has arisen in the Army. The Secretary would like to know, do you want to investigate it or do you want him to investigate it? I had learned that Congress is rarely interested in anything it doesn't discover itself... So, in every case, they said, "We'd like the Secretary to investigate it." We investigated it very honestly, laid the facts before them and if you look back over that very traumatic period of the

Korean War, you'll find virtually no Congressional investigation of the Army."<sup>44</sup>

To deal with the Army's image problem nationwide as well as the problems associated with Senator McCarthy on the Armed Services Committee, Secretary Pace created and recruited "Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army."

"Just as I sought to deal honestly with the Congress, I also sought to deal honestly with the press... If there was a newspaper story that reflected badly on the Army, I asked my Civilian Aides to, themselves, check out the validity of the story... If it were inaccurate, and these were generally quite prestigious people, I said, "You should say this is an inaccurate story and you should not pursue it."... You know it's not the one day story that ever hurts you; it's the one on Tuesday that comes back on Thursday and then is there on Saturday and the next Monday. Those are the ones that really hurt you. So I sought in that way, by identifying both to Congress and the press, the accurate facts to mitigate the negative impact on the Army in a difficult period."<sup>45</sup>

The next problem Secretary Pace saw was the problem of a peacetime Army:

"Secondarily, an Army in peacetime is obviously a difficult pattern to manage and establish, because the function of an Army is to fight a war. It's very much as though you took General Motors and their whole establishment on for a full year without producing an automobile."<sup>46</sup>

"I've always observed that the Army seems to do most of the work during the war and always seems to come out of it with the poorest program in the post-war period."<sup>47</sup>

His solution to the peacetime Army problem was quite rational, though perhaps more difficult to execute than to design:

"I felt that we really had to think 15, 20 years down the road what the Army was going to be then and what it needed to be..."<sup>48</sup>



"... I was convinced, and I was reinforced in this by General Marshall's conviction, that we were entering a totally new era. We were entering an era in which the Cold War, that involved a number of minor hot wars, represented a tide that ebbed and flowed in the whole international political system. That wars were no longer great international collisions but that wars had to be treated in terms of long range national policy."<sup>49</sup>

Two areas that Secretary Pace thought had been neglected and should be revitalized were intelligence and research and development, (R&D). He strongly resisted tinkering with the military promotion system, but he did recognize that the consequences of the promotion system influenced programs. He had some disagreements with the Army Staff over these points. Ultimately, the military successes in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm have certainly vindicated Secretary Pace's concentration on intelligence and R&D. In Pace's common sense view of R&D, there is always a problem getting designers and users together:

"...the user wants to have something that works. The designer wants to take you out beyond where you are."<sup>50</sup>

On civilian control of the military, Pace remarked:

"The military, I have always felt, is far more responsive to civilian leadership and to the basic civilian concept of our society than most people and certainly most columnists are prepared to admit."<sup>51</sup>

An anecdote with Secretary of Defense Marshall illustrates the keen analysis and sense of humor of both men. General Marshall was the chairman of the NATO defense ministers. He was considering sending Secretary Pace to a

particularly difficult session, in which NATO was to be reorganized, General Eisenhower was to be appointed Supreme Commander, and Germany was to be brought into NATO.

Secretary Pace asked for a day to think it over, and General Marshall agreed. Early the next morning, Secretary Pace gave his response:

**"General Marshall, I don't want you to think I can't do the job. I think I can. But, I'm a very young man and Europeans respect maturity. I think you'd do well to send an older man."**

General Marshall thanked him and said that he had decided to send him. Secretary Pace asked if he might comment? When General Marshall agreed, Secretary Pace said:

**"Well, two things, General Marshall. First, you can't think very much of my judgment, and second, you could have spared me a sleepless night."**

Secretary Pace related that General Marshall

**"twinkled a little, which was rare, and he said, 'Frankly, Pace, I didn't know I was going to send you, until I heard your answer.' "**<sup>52</sup>

Secretary Pace went to the meeting and successfully completed the three difficult tasks.

### **Twelve Lessons Learned from Secretary Frank Pace**

1. Be confident. Whatever the problem, you can handle it.
2. See that the Army is well run. Work on major decisions.
3. Great management can separate the "doable" from the "non-doable." Organize to make what is workable, work.
4. Go out of your way to talk to the previous Secretaries.
5. Develop and maintain deep respect for members of Congress. Deal straight with Congress.
6. Minimize Congressional investigations by informing Congress of problems early. Ask if they want to investigate or to let the Army investigate. Congressional committees usually only investigate their own discoveries.
7. Work on the Army's image, especially through influential people in each state. Let them deal with bad stories in the press. Deal straight with the Press. Forget retractions.
8. Learn to respect the military people. They are among the best educated and talented of our citizens.
9. Recognize the problems of the peacetime Army.
10. Two areas usually neglected during peacetime are intelligence and research & development (R&D). End users and innovators have to be brought together.
11. Wars are part of the international political system and need to be included in long range national policy.
12. Think 15, 20 years from now. What will the Army be and what does it need to be.

### Establishment of the War Department

After George Washington established the War Office in 1776, Congress established the Department of War in 1789. The funding appropriation followed. Since that time funding has often been a moving target. In the early days, the process of "legislating" (later called authorization) was informally separated from appropriation. The U.S. House in 1837, and the U.S. Senate in 1850, adopted rules formally requiring that appropriations bills be preceded by authorization legislation.<sup>53</sup> Separating these activities among different committees seemed a reasonable solution, but over time, the responsibilities of these committees have become blurred.

Because the young United States was the "most conspicuous neutral shipping nation"<sup>54</sup> during the European wars, Congress voted to resurrect sixteen coastal forts. In response to the continued piracy by the Barbary States, in the Naval Act of 1794 Congress voted a navy of six frigates, construction to cease if peace should break out with the Regency of Algiers. Even though on March 15, 1796, President Washington informed Congress it had, Congress approved completion of the 44-gun frigates, *United States*, *Constitution*, and the 38-gun *Constellation*.<sup>55</sup> When undeclared hostilities with France broke out in 1798, Congress voted completion of the original six frigates and creation of the Navy Department. First Secretary of the

Navy Benjamin Stoddert, a Georgetown merchant, was appointed by President Adams. Secretary Stoddert managed the building of the Navy and developed its initial strategy of naval deterrence. Setting the standard for future naval growth strategy, he sold Congress on appropriating a million dollars to construct six 74-gun ships of the line. When peace broke out with France, the plans were canceled.<sup>56</sup>

The War and Navy Departments grew gradually. As hostilities cycled with peace, the departments expanded and contracted. With the advent of the Defense Department in 1947, the military departments were huge organizations. Because of their size and complexity, as previously compared with civilian corporations, it is logical to look for lessons learned in the world of corporate governance. Many of the issues surrounding the Service Secretary follow historically the issues associated with corporate governance and corporate boards in the business community.

Robert K. Mueller, former Chairman of Arthur D. Little, recently noted that the role that Secretary Pace chose, seeing that the Army is well run, is now commonly referred to as 'governance' in corporate circles. Mr. Mueller's definition of governance included:

**"ensuring that long term strategic objectives and plans are established, ensuring that the management and structure is in place to work the plans to achieve those strategic objectives, and making sure the structure has maintained its responsibilities to its respective constituencies."**<sup>57</sup>

He related the challenge to the old business dichotomy: doing the right things vs. doing things right, Corporate boards should be concerned with doing the right things, while managers pursue doing things right.

Another key ingredient in wise governance is vision. In his classic article, Abraham Zalenik wrote, "Vision, the hallmark of leadership, is less a derivative of spreadsheets and more a product of the mind called imagination. And vision is needed at least as much as strategy to succeed."<sup>58</sup>

Vision links a view of a better situation in the future with the resources and a deadline for accomplishing that view. Jules Verne described a imaginative trip to the moon, but President Kennedy had a vision of putting a man on the moon, with the resources required and a deadline.

### **Learning from the Corporate Director**

Traditionally, the corporate board has been responsible for exercising "all of the authority of a corporation."<sup>59</sup> During the latter half of the twentieth century, it became apparent that corporate governance was better and corporate shareholders were better represented when corporate boards included a group of "outside" directors, often defined as independent of the management.

"Since 1956, the [New York Stock] Exchange has required all domestic companies listing on the Exchange to have at least two outside directors on their boards."<sup>60</sup>

One of the pioneers in the dynamic and productive use

of the corporate board was Pat Haggerty, the Chairman of the Board of Texas Instruments.

"Back in 1966, Pat Haggerty, then [Texas Instrument's] Chairman, observed that it was time 'to do some real pioneering in the structuring of a board of directors.'"<sup>61</sup>

"Haggerty recognized the necessity, especially in volatile technology-intensive businesses, that a mechanism be provided 'at a very high level' for objective deliberations on questions of basic corporate policy and direction... A stated objective of the company is that a majority of the board, excluding the Chairman and the President, are to be individuals whose primary experience has been other than at TI."<sup>62</sup>

Haggerty's hard working board made a major contribution toward building TI into a billion dollar company.

When Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Organization, Structure and Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense, he said:

"one of the major steps we took was to make the Service Secretaries members of the Defense Resources Board - the Department's Board of Directors, if you will - the body of senior officials that advises the Deputy Secretary and myself on the major resource decisions of the Department. This change not only strengthened the role of the service secretaries, but also improved the quality of our deliberations."<sup>63</sup>

While the functions and responsibilities of the Service Secretary do not perfectly match those of a corporate outside director, it is easy to see these ideas in the expectations of those who have seriously evaluated the Service Secretary's role and performance over the last twenty years. Many similar ideas appeared in the Senate

report: Defense Organization: the Need for Change. For example, in the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, Congress specifically directed that Service Secretaries be appointed from civilian life - not from the services. There are enough similarities that there are important lessons to be learned.

In his November 2, 1983 remarks to the same Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Marsh discussed the positive similarities of roles between corporate governance and the civilian leadership in the military departments:

**"First, as Administrations change, the Secretariat system brings to key leadership posts in the department of the Army and the other Services, individuals with different backgrounds and broad experience resulting in an infusion of new ideas and concepts.**

**Second, there is a role of accountability to the Congress for which there is a special responsibility of civilian appointees.**

**Third, the placement of civilians in positions of senior leadership of the Armed Services provides a surety or guarantor on the conduct of the military departments."**<sup>64</sup>

A synopsis of lessons learned from corporate governance follows. (More detailed information is in Appendix A.)



## **Twelve Lessons Learned from Corporate Governance**

1. The board is responsible to authorize major corporate actions.
2. Review major corporate objectives/strategies/budgets/policies.
3. The chief executive needs to be receptive to board advice.
4. Judge and evaluate the performance of management.
5. Members need to be influential, and well respected, and have broad experience.
6. Sufficient information, accurate in scope and detail, must be available, early enough for the director to adequately discharge the duties of a board member. The board member must keep informed about the significant activities of the organization, business in general, legislation, and regulatory matters.
7. An exemplary code of behavior, morals, and values is important.
8. The director is an enthusiastic, effective spokesperson. Be conscious of the organization, and the window to and from the outside world.
9. The director thinks, speaks, and acts independently and conscientiously. Ask important, discerning questions. Act as key resource and counsel to top management and rest of the board.

10. Assure law compliance. Uncover/thwart fraudulent or illegal activities.

11. Look for new business opportunities and be a positive force on the future thinking of the organization. Help win the support of outside organizations, suppliers, customers, and investors.

12. Act in crisis situations.

(This is synopsis of the work summarized in Appendix D.)

## **Civilian Control of the Military**

With the responsibilities of the corporate director as a frame of reference, one of the key contemporary issues for the service Secretary and in organization of the defense establishment is the relationship of civilians and the military. On March 24, 1765, the British passed the Quartering Act, which required colonists to provide housing for British soldiers.<sup>65</sup> Based on the high handed way the British military treated the civilians in our colonies, our founding fathers were sensitized. These early Americans clearly recognized the evils of a strong military unresponsive to the desires of the civilian populace. For these reasons, the issue of civilian control predates the Declaration of Independence:

**"In all cases the military should be under strict subordination to and governed by civil power."**

This quotation came from the Virginia Declaration of Rights, June 12, 1776. Subsequently, the U.S. Constitution included this same idea. The President and the Congress were given power over the military.

President Harry Truman called it: **"one of the most fundamental of our democratic concepts"**<sup>67</sup> The issue is still considered of critical importance. The 1985 SASC report, Defense Organization: The Need for Change said:

**"The most fundamental and important principle governing the organization and operation of the U.S. military establishment is civilian control of the military."**<sup>68</sup>

Not all of our leaders are satisfied with civilian control. During the 1983 Senate hearings on Organization, Structure, and Decisionmaking, Senator Goldwater said:

"The question is, can we, as a country, any longer afford the 207-year-old concept that in military matters the civilian is supreme? ... We have lost the last two wars we have fought because they have been run by civilians in Washington... The question in my mind is, can we any longer afford to allow the expertise of men and women trained, at terrific expense, in what I consider to be the finest military academies in the world, to be set aside for the decisions of the civilians whose decisions have not been wrapped in war... When you are flying a mission and you see a target and you ask the pilot, 'Let us go down and hit that thing,' and he says, 'We can't, we have to take a picture of it and send it back to Washington,' that is a heck of a way to run a war."<sup>69</sup>

The civilian control issue has perhaps been blown out of proportion. The issue has generally been raised by leaders who have had a problem with unresponsive military leaders. President Truman had Secretary Pace relieve an unruly MacArthur. Secretary Root rebuked and retired an insubordinate Commanding General Miles.<sup>70</sup> Nevertheless, no serious threat to the United States has been mounted by the military, since the time of George Washington. Further, the 1978 Steadman Report examining the military command structure found no reason for concern:

"We find the concept of civilian control over the military is unquestioned throughout the Department. It is a non-issue. Our military forces are fully responsive to the command and control of the duly constituted civilian authorities; the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary."<sup>71</sup>

"Finally, as noted at the outset, there is no readily available definition of the meaning of civilian control.

However, the experience of nearly two centuries of American history suggests that this absence of a definition has served us well. As with other constitutional doctrines which are broad and do not have specific definition, civilian control of the military has given the system the political flexibility that is needed to maintain the essence of the principle, i.e. that the President is Commander-in-Chief must be able to control the use of the armed forces. But, at the same time, it has not crippled the valuable professional advice or the role played by the professional military officer. It also preserves the ability to adjust the system to changing circumstances and new challenges."<sup>72</sup>

### **Three Guiding Principles for the U.S. Armed Forces**

Instead of the primary emphasis on civilian control of the military, the following three interrelated, fundamental principles are offered by the author as guiding principles to govern the organization and operation of the U.S. armed forces:

- A. The armed forces must prepare for and execute their share of the National Security Policy of the United States, under civilian leadership, now and in the future.**
- B. Our armed forces should only be put at risk for compelling reasons.**
- C. People should have what they need to do their jobs; effectively and efficiently integrate the talent and the resources.**

**A. The armed forces must prepare for and execute their share of the National Security Policy of the United States, under civilian leadership, now and in the future. This principle fits the counsel of great strategist Carl von**

Clausewitz:

"...war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means... Do political relations between peoples and between their governments stop when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged? Is war not just another expression of their thoughts, another form of speech or writing? Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic."<sup>73</sup>

Use of force by the armed forces is but one part of the of our National Security; others parts include economic power and diplomacy. It is appropriate that our armed forces do their share to protect and defend the United States and its citizens, as well as its territorial integrity, interests, and institutions.

Further, it is realistic to expect this mission to continue for the far distant future. Perhaps the most important legacy a secretary leaves involves acquisition decisions on major programs, many of which will not come to fruition during his watch. The M-1 tank so successful in *Operation Desert Storm* resulted from major research and development decisions in the 1970's. If the secretary has a clear vision of future military operations, he has a better chance of making better decisions. In some cases, this tenet may demand supporting an acquisition in another service, e.g. strategic lift, or in an ally's service, e.g. minesweepers. As Secretary Pace pointed out, you have to look 15 or 20 years into the future, and then decide where the Army should be.

**B. Our armed forces should only be put at risk for compelling reasons. This statement includes two of Secretary Weinberger's 1984 Six Major Tests for Use of U.S. Combat Forces:**

**"First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.**

**"Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort."<sup>74</sup>**

The second test above relates to the cited Clausewitz quotation.

Because we are a democracy, without a mercenary armed force of Hessians, there is an important associated responsibility to put our armed forces at minimum risk, and only when other elements of national power fail. The members of our armed forces are our citizens also, because they are willing to risk their lives is no reason to do it capriciously.

This view reflects the precedent in the writings of the great Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, in The Art of War, about 500 B.C.:

**"Only when the enemy could not be overcome by these [other] means was there recourse to armed force, which was to be applied so that victory was gained:**

- (a) in the shortest possible time;**
- (b) at the least possible cost in lives and effort;**
- (c) with infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties."<sup>75</sup>**

Beyond the obvious combat issues, there are four less obvious implications of this principle. First, even during

the drawdown, we must maintain adequate combat power, so that the remaining force is not at risk by its small size. Second, we must conscientiously acquire what our forces need to do their job, within reason, so our troops are not overpowered on the battlefield. Third, we need to work to minimize the fratricide problem. Fourth, we have to work continuously on safety in training, as well as in all other areas. We must constantly protect the lives of all of the defense community.

**C. People should have what they need to do their jobs; effectively and efficiently integrate the talent and the resources.** This principle is in keeping with the responsible stewardship ideas of Secretary Michael P. W. Stone in his January 1990 Report of the Secretary of the Army.

**"We also made important strides in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of our use of the resources entrusted to us."**<sup>76</sup>

While effectiveness measures the accomplishment of a task, in peace or war, efficiency may have some different implications. Efficiency is normally a measure relating accomplishment with cost. In peacetime, cost is generally described in dollars. In war, cost is more importantly related to lives of our citizens and soldiers. Because many of the major decisions in the defense effort have significant wartime implications, decisions examined for



efficiency should not be measured simply in dollars, without some understanding of the wartime consequences of the choices.

Providing people what they need also may include the authority to get the job done. It further may include the training, information, and time necessary for the task at hand. It may include spare parts, on time.

We are entering an era in which fewer people will be expected to do more with less. It is only fair to provide people what they need to do the jobs we expect of them. Especially Americans at risk in combat should have what they need to complete their mission. Together, these three guiding principles provide a firm, tested foundation upon which to base major decisions.

### **Evolution of the Role of the Service Secretary**

Over the years, the Service Secretary's role has changed. It is worthwhile to examine a number of different views. An excellent description of the view from Congress is Senator Sam Nunn's remarks at the confirmation hearings of Secretary designate H. Lawrence Garrett in 1989:

**"Beyond the vast duties of managing the Department of the Navy, including its two military services, the Navy and the Marine Corps, the Secretary of the Navy has significant responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Navy has the duty to ensure that the policies and programs of his Department are fully consistent with the overall defense objectives and policies.**

**He also has a statutory requirement to ensure that the**

Navy fulfills to the maximum extent practical, current and future operational requirements of the unified and specified combatant commanders. In this regard, the Secretary of Navy, like the other service Secretaries, is often the man in the middle. In part, he is an advocate for his department, but as the senior subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, he has a key role in the formulation and implementation of a coherent and integrated defense program."<sup>77</sup>

A similar description is provided by former Secretary of the Air Force Eugene Zuckert:

"What emerged from the confrontation was a clearer recognition of the role of the Service Secretary as 'the man in the middle.' He is called upon to do something that is often quite difficult - to fight for what he thinks is right within the Pentagon, then help present a unified facade outside."<sup>78</sup>

He further believed that the independence of the Secretary was important to his continued credibility and effectiveness:

"When a Service Secretary merely restates automatically an Administration position which may be diametrically opposed to his views as expressed before that official position was announced, he soon loses effectiveness... During the B-36 inquiry, Navy Secretary Francis Matthews was so far from positions held within his own Department that he was rendered almost useless in the job."<sup>79</sup>

Secretary Zuchert believed that the Matthews resignation the following year was predicated on his embarrassment.

Paul Schratz has documented Navy Secretary Nitze's independence:

"Throughout his service as SecNav, Nitze defined a role which frequently placed him in the middle of moderate-to-serious disagreement with either the admirals or the Defense leadership, and occasionally with both... Nitze was quite successful, however, in choosing those issues in which he would challenge the position either of Defense or the service, and his role as Secretary of the Navy was defined

accordingly."<sup>80</sup>

"The secretary emerged not as a special pleader for a service viewpoint, not self-identified with service programs, but with a special perspective in coordinating Defense policy which could not be fulfilled by an Assistant SecDef. He advises the Secretary of Defense and serves as an intelligent advocate of service interests at the defense level - a job which a military chief or a Defense official could rarely discharge as effectively."<sup>81</sup>

From his first-hand experience, Secretary Zuckert saw the importance and contribution of the Secretary:

"The Service Secretary, based on the evolution of his role as I have observed and experienced it, fulfills a managerial responsibility at precisely that middle level which cannot be discharged as well anywhere else in the Department of Defense as now constituted."<sup>82</sup>

Paul Nitze became Secretary of the Navy in an unusual way, but he was well known for his performance in the job:

"President Kennedy had an immediate need to nominate a successor to Fred Korth, the secretary he had had to relieve. He asked me to take the job. I had no desire to leave the mainstream of national security policy formulation. Kennedy assured me he would get me out of the Navy job and into the type of position I wanted in no more than six months. But within a month he had been assassinated. It was some four years later that President Johnson promoted me to succeed Cyrus Vance as deputy secretary of defense."<sup>83</sup>

Nitze's recognition of the teamwork of his uniformed leadership is reminiscent of Secretary Pace's view:

"The top Navy senior officers were an exceptionally able group. After I had fired one admiral who persisted in refusing to follow my guidance, I found I gained certain respect... I was fortunate in the selection of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral David L. McDonald... McDonald often differed with my judgment, but if, after he had an opportunity to fully present his views, I remained unpersuaded, he would back me wholeheartedly. On many issues I came to consider his judgment superior to mine, particularly on the politics of the Washington bureaucratic

scene."<sup>84</sup>

Prior to his appointment as Secretary of the Navy, Paul Nitze saw a different view as one of 'McNamara Whiz Kids:'

"It's not surprising that the military top brass, with their decades of experience and accumulation of applied wisdom, were dismayed by an attempt to turn the Pentagon into a command post of theory and untried ideas. To come up with novel ideas is relatively easy; sometimes that is necessary and highly useful. What is difficult is first to achieve a solid basis for confidence that the ideas can be made to work, and second, to make them actually work."<sup>85</sup>

These quotations give a representative sample from people who had important views. There are other views.

### **The Detractors**

There have been those who have felt that the Service Secretary was not necessary. Whether they were biased will be left to the reader.

In December 1960, Senator Stuart Symington, D-Missouri, headed a six-man group, who gave President-elect Kennedy a 5,000 word proposal recommending sweeping changes in the defense structure. One of the recommendations was to abolish the separate departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Understanding Senator Symington's view explains his position. Senator Symington had been a former Secretary of the Air Force. In the late fifties and early sixties, the Air Force's bombers were the only nuclear strategic weapon system. From his view and experience, the new defense

effort would be dominated by nuclear issues, so the new defense structure should be appropriately consolidated around the Air Force. Secretary of the Air Force Eugene Zuckert made this assessment in 1966.<sup>86</sup>

Roswell Gilpatric, who became McNamara's Deputy SecDef, and formerly head of the pre-inaugural task force, recommended abolishing the service secretary.<sup>87</sup> Deputy Secretary Cyrus Vance answered the criticism in 1966:

"I believe strongly in the importance of, and the need for, Military Departments. We can't run the Defense Department without them. . . . With from \$12 to \$20 billion a year in resources to manage, it seems to me essential to have a Service Secretary and a Chief of Staff who can administer such a vast program. Also, I believe that separate Military Departments are very important in terms of morale and esprit, which are largely the result of the long tradition of each of the Services. I think it would be very wrong to do away with them. [We can have] unity of effort . . . without unification of the Military Departments."<sup>88</sup>

President Richard Nixon revealed his low opinion of the value of the Secretary of the Navy, when he recommended a prospective nominee:

"It's a job anyone can do, and he can't do any harm over there."<sup>89</sup>

In 1975, Editor Benjamin F. Schemmer, published a scathing editorial (with no byline) in the Armed Forces Journal International, "Let's Fire 18 Presidential Appointees":

"The Service Secretariats should be abolished. They are an anachronism. . . . They're dedicated people, these 18 Presidential appointees and their 1,023 horseholders. But, what they do is irrelevant. They don't make policy; they just ask questions. They can't approve anything; all they

have are negative votes. They exercise no substantive 'civilian control' over the military, for they have no charter over operational matters - just administrative, management and budget ones. And they don't handle the latter ones very well because they don't stay in office long enough to slice the onion more than one peel deep."<sup>90</sup>

Tenure of appointees has often been a problem; in the fifteen years from 1966-1981, there were eighteen service secretaries.<sup>91</sup> While some of these criticisms may have some basis, following the advice completely would lead to inappropriate overcentralization. This problem was even recognized by the Senate staff:

"...while centralization can marginally lessen the impact of poor integration mechanisms, it cannot achieve the appropriate level of mission integration. Moreover, overcentralizaion has its own problems in that the complexity of modern defense issues is too great for a small group of decision-makers to handle by themselves. This is more true today than during Secretary McNamara's tenure."<sup>92</sup>

In a New York Times front page story, former Secretary Elvis Stahr underscored the overcentralization problem after he left office. Although he praised Secretary McNamara's ability, he felt that the micromanagement of the Secretary constituted "overreaching" in personal control.<sup>93</sup>

### **Operational Issues**

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 intentionally removed the Secretary from operational matters. The Senate Committee on Armed Services intent is shown in the Senate report accompanying the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act:

The [previous] statute dealing with the responsibilities of the Secretary of the Army includes functions necessary or appropriate for the "operations" of the Army. The Committee recommends that "operations" be removed from any prescription of the responsibilities of the Secretary of the Army. This recommendation seeks to avoid confusing the separate and distinct responsibilities of the operational and administrative elements of the Department of Defense. Military operations are the sole responsibility of the operational chain of command which does not include the Military Departments. While removing "operations" from the responsibilities of the Secretary of the Army for this important purpose, the Committee agrees that each Secretary of a Military Department would retain authority to use military equipment and forces for activities such as disaster relief, response to domestic disturbances, public affairs, the operations of non-combatant forces, public affairs, the operations of non-combatant forces, and many training activities.<sup>94</sup>

There is a precedent for such micromanagement:

The National Defense Act of 1916 severely cut the size of the General Staff... From May 1917 until August 1918 the structure of the General Staff went through almost continuous reorganization. The original staff organization proved unable to cope with the emergency created by American mobilization, particularly in the supply field.<sup>95</sup>

After President Roosevelt declared a state of national emergency on 8 September 1939, he required that the Army Air Corps be expanded regardless of the cost to the Army ground forces. Further, he gave priority to the Lend Lease program over U.S. unit mobilization and training. By 1941, Under Secretary Robert Patterson, responsible for both the Lend lease and Army procurement, questioned the sufficiency of industrial preparedness. On April 18, 1941, Patterson asked Secretary Stimson, and subsequently the General Staff, for guidance:

How much production was necessary to ensure victory if the United States went to war, he wondered, keeping in mind 'probable enemies, friends and theaters of operations'? Patterson's question was one with which officers on the staff of the G-4 and War Plans Division had particular sympathy. On the basis of long years of reviewing industrial mobilization plans, Army staffers understood that industrial production was intimately related to organization and, by extension, to tactics.<sup>96</sup>

#### **Problems of Nunn/Warner Reorganization Act**

The problem of removing the Service Secretary is that it intends removal from all operational matters. There is no need to be in the chain of command, but specific exclusion of the Service Secretary from all operational matters is excessive. It is unlikely that a Service Secretary, intentionally excluded from operational issues, will build the optimal Army to support the warfighting CINCs. The Total Army must be built and integrated over time. A successful Service Secretary must have excellent vision to put in motion many projects which will become the coordinated, integrated Total Army which may be called upon tomorrow. Few of the major successes in the battles of Desert Storm resulted primarily from last minute work; most were the result of careful, coordinated, combat and materiel developments complemented by years of intense training over the preceding fifteen years. It is unlikely that a future Secretary intentionally omitted from operational matters will have vision congruent with the Chairman of the JCS and the warfighting CINCs. Without careful teamwork, his



contribution and their fight will suffer. In 1981, John Kester pointed out the difficulty of managing readiness without clear understanding of operational issues.

"To be useful, the service secretary needs to understand enough about policy, operations, and overall defense strategy to be able to converse in terms to which the Secretary of Defense will respond. He cannot, for example, effectively work to build his service's readiness if he has no knowledge of operations. A DoD directive requires that the chiefs keep their secretaries briefed on what the joint chiefs are up to, and the wise secretary will not let that obligation be ignored."<sup>97</sup>

If you look at *Operation Desert Shield*, the service staffs worked hard in the support of the operation - on a daily basis. It worked well in general, because there was a mission-oriented attitude of: "We have troops in combat; let's do what we can to help them." In our lifetime, we have had troops fighting in two theaters. The problems that Secretary Stimson and General Marshall faced are now given to the joint staff, yet the people who work most of the issues involving how the Army is organized, equipped, and trained are on the service staffs - where they should be. If we have to fight a two front war, we are cutting key players out of the action.

Most of the issues of raising, training, equipping our Army are based upon anticipated operations. Further, the concept of the Total Army has a foundation of mobilization. In the recent *Operation Desert Shield*, mobilization and deployment of reserve forces was a critical part of the

operation. The mission unfolded in an unusual way: one field army was built as combat forces were deployed rapidly, followed by their support echelons. The mission was to defend our ally, Saudi Arabia, from aggression. During the second week of November, after the national election, the mission changed to deploy a much larger force, capable of offensive operations to restore Kuwait. Again, major mobilization and deployment of a second set of reserve component units was required. This time, combat service support units needed to precede the combat units, so that units, equipment, and supplies for a major operation could be moved into position.

To say that the Army builds and trains units which are then deployed into combat is an oversimplification, which overlooks how the Army is really built. We have a huge and complex Army, which is constantly being modernized as equipment is purchased and issued - taken from another unit and reissued. A tactical unit is equipped under a Table of Organization and Allowances, TO&E. TO&E are designed for type units. Generally, units are modernized from what they had yesterday, seldom with an entirely new set of equipment. The diversity of organizations and variety, quantity, and locations of equipment makes total support complex.<sup>98</sup>

In general, equipment is assigned first to units expected to fight first. This means that it takes a lot of

work to deploy forces, far beyond simply notifying a stable list of units to deploy. That "simple" task also takes a gargantuan effort.

Another issue that will become a more difficult problem is the mobilization and deployment of forces during combat. We have already had a no-notice war in Saudi Arabia. After the proposed drawdown of forces is complete, the United States will really have to scramble to assemble a strong combat force half way around the world. Success on the battlefield will depend to a great extent on our ability to mass our combat power overseas. Being able to do that is not simply the challenge of the warfighting CINC in theater. Our success as a Nation will depend on our ability to bring the full national defense capability, uniformed and civilian, industrial and transportation, domestic and ally, to bear on the enemy - quickly. In time of crisis, there is plenty of work for everyone.

There are not many players in the Defense Department, who have service-wide integration responsibility. Cutting out the Service Secretaries neglects three key people whose view and mission is to integrate their respective total departmental efforts. As Abraham Zaleznik observed in his Harvard Business Review classic: "When it ain't broke may be the only time you can fix it."<sup>99</sup> While the armed services are not in combat is the time to correct the operations

disconnect issue. This problem should be fixed now, by changing the law back to the previous position, including the Service Secretary in operational matters.

It is naive to conceptually ignore the complexity of building, training, and maintaining the best possible Total Army at the least possible cost. Intentionally cutting the Secretary of the Army out of "operations" is shortsighted. It detracts from combat capabilities rather than adds.

#### **Secretary McNamara's Fast Start**

In the research on Service Secretaries, one of the most striking phenomena was the speed with which Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was able to very rapidly take the reins of the Department of Defense and "hit the ground running," to be effective, very rapidly. Secretary McNamara consented to an interview. In response to the question, how did he do it, he answered,

**Two reasons: First, he had received a promise from President-elect Kennedy that he could man his subordinate positions with the most able people he could find, without regard for political affiliation. As a result, he recruited many very experienced men, like Cyrus Vance and Paul Nitze. He felt he had the finest group of associates of any Cabinet member, possibly ever.**

**Second, he had been an administrator and executive for fifteen years; he could identify and address problems.<sup>100</sup>**

This is a key lesson for a transition team.

## Conclusion

There is still a vital role for the Service Secretary today. Three guiding principles should provide direction:

**A. Under civilian leadership, the armed forces must prepare for and execute their share of the National Security Policy of the United States, now and in the future.**

**B. Our armed forces should only be put at risk for compelling reasons.**

**C. People should have what they need to do their jobs; effectively and efficiently integrate the talent and the resources.**

Twelve lessons each were drawn from great Secretaries Root and Pace. In addition, twelve tenets were drawn from the world of successful corporate governance. Former Secretary McNamara provided one lesson. Together, the lessons can tame the chaos the Secretary will soon meet.

The challenges of today's Service Secretary are best summed up by the words of Secretary Pace, looking back on his years of service:

**"You give [the Army] a task that's infinitely more difficult than you give a business organization, infinitely more difficult than you give a non-profit organization. I would say to manage one of the great services well, is one of the unique challenges of our times... I do find that in view of its size, the complexity of its responsibilities, the lack of relation between its budget and its assigned responsibilities, that it has a management task second to none."**<sup>101</sup>

The way the Service Secretary organizes, equips, trains, and governs our Service will significantly determine the future successes on battlefields and the lives of the Americans and friends committed on those battlefields. The

valuable lessons of past successes offer the best advantage toward future success. We can accept no lesser challenge than to apply our best efforts to make the best possible American Armed Services.

## Appendix A

### Corporate Directors Lessons Learned

Several views of the lessons learned from corporate directors will be helpful. In 1976, John Phillips documented the basic responsibilities of an outside director: obedience, diligence and loyalty. Further, he noted a dozen additional duties and responsibilities:

1. Authorize major corporate actions
2. Keep informed about the activities of the corporation
3. Advise management
4. Judge and evaluate the performance of management (including the CEO); a monitoring function
5. Uncover/thwart fraudulent or illegal activities
6. Select and elect the CEO and authorize him to take certain types of action
7. Review major corporate objectives/strategies/budgets/policies, etc. initiated by management
8. Monitor the company's financial structure
9. Assure law compliance
10. Ask important, discerning questions
11. Be conscious of the company, and a window to and from the outside world
12. Act in crisis situations<sup>102</sup>

These generic responsibilities are augmented by some resulting from Securities and Exchange Commission cases. In the S.E.C. ruling on the Stirling Homex Corporation case, Phillips noted the following four additional points on responsibility:

- "1. Outsiders violate their duty to protect shareholders if their presence on the board has no impact whatsoever on the corporation's operations or affairs
2. Outsiders cannot blindly rely on the fact that the

corporation employs accountants, lawyers, investment bankers and other professionals

3. Directors should familiarize themselves with the corporation's business and question in more than a perfunctory manner

4. Finally, management was given the responsibility of making available to outsiders sufficient information concerning the corporation's affairs to enable them to adequately discharge their responsibilities"<sup>103</sup>

Another view comes from the joint study published by The Conference Board and the American Society of Corporate Secretaries in 1975 which suggested four ingredients of effectiveness for corporate boards:

"1. *Competent and diligent directors...* This is partly a question of solid individual qualifications and of having a balance of background and experience on the board.

2. *Adequate information.* A board can only be effective if it has access to company information that is both adequate in its scope and detail and also accurate. It must be available sufficiently in advance of decisions so that the board can use it.

3. *Use of committees.* A feature of most effective boards seems to be the use of committees to concentrate on important areas of board responsibility.

4. *A receptive chief executive* - by far the most essential ingredient."<sup>104</sup>

Robert K. Mueller, president Arthur D. Little, developed a "guide for director effectiveness:

1. *Competence as a Director* - Experienced, trained, influential, and well respected.

2. *Ethics* - Exemplary code of behavior, morals, and values.

3. *Ambassadorship* - An enthusiastic, effective spokesperson for the company.

4. *Independence* - Thinks, speaks, acts independently with confidence and courage.

5. *Preparation* - Briefs self well. Sincerely interested. Stays up to date with the business, business in general, and legislative and regulatory matters.

6. *Director Practices* - Asks probing questions, stays away from trying to manage, acts key resource and counsel to top management and the rest of the board.



7. *Committee Service* - Usefully serves on at least one committee and does it with enthusiasm and ideas. Does homework.

8. *Corporate Development* - Helps win support of outside organizations, customers, and investors. Looks for new business opportunities and is positive force on the future thinking of the corporation.

9. *Attendance* - Attends all meetings, plans ahead for them, maximizes exposure to other directors, comes prepared."<sup>105</sup>

## Appendix B

### Legislative Requirements of the Secretary of the Army

#### 10 USC 3013. Secretary of the Army

(a)(1) There is a Secretary of the Army, appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Secretary is the head of the Department of the Army.

(2) A person may not be appointed as Secretary of the Army within 10 years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force.

(b) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the provisions of chapter 6 of this title, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of the department of the Army, including the following functions:

- (1) Recruiting.
- (2) Organizing.
- (3) Supplying.
- (4) Equipping (including research and development).
- (5) Training.
- (6) Servicing.
- (7) Mobilizing.
- (8) Demobilizing.
- (9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).
- (10) Maintaining.
- (11) The construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment.
- (12) The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section.

(c) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army is also responsible to the Secretary of Defense for-

- (1) the functioning and efficiency of the Department of the Army;
- (2) the formulation of policies and programs by the Department of the Army that are fully consistent with national security objectives and policies established by the President or the Secretary of Defense;
- (3) the effective and timely implementation of

policy, program, and budget decisions and instructions of the President or the Secretary of Defense relating to the functions of the Department of the Army;

(4) carrying out the functions of the Department of the Army so as to fulfill (to the maximum extent practicable) the current and future operational requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands;

(5) effective cooperation and coordination between the Department of the Army and other military departments and agencies of the Department of Defense to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and to eliminate duplication;

(6) the representation and justification of the positions of the Department of the Army on the plans, programs, and policies of the Department of defense; and

(7) the effective supervision and control of the intelligence activities of the Department of the Army.

(d) The Secretary of the Army is also responsible for such other activities as may be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.

(e) After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he considers appropriate.

(f) The Secretary of the Army may assign such of his functions, powers, and duties as he considers appropriate to the Under Secretary of the Army and to the assistant Secretaries of the Army. Officers of the Army shall, as directed by the Secretary, report on any matter to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, or any Assistant Secretary.

(g) The Secretary of the Army may-

(1) assign, detail, and prescribe the duties of members of the Army and civilian personnel of the Department of the Army;

(2) change the title of any officer or activity of the Department of the Army not prescribed by law; and

(3) prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title.

Sec. 102. Powers and Duties of the Secretary of Defense  
10 USC 1022,1075. Section 113

(h) The Secretary of Defense shall keep the Secretaries of the military departments informed with respect to military operations and activities of the Department of Defense that directly affect their respective responsibilities.

## Appendix C

Record of telephonic interview: **The Honorable Robert S. McNamara**,  
1455 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Ste 515, Washington, DC 20004  
(202) 347-2273; FAX: (202) 347-2315  
Time: 1102 hrs, EDT, 23 April 1992, by Van Cunningham.

Question: When he became Secretary of Defense, how was he able to "spin up," to become so effective, so quickly?

Answer: Two reasons:

First, he had received a promise from President-elect Kennedy that he could man his subordinate positions with the most able people he could find, without regard for political affiliation. As a result, he recruited many very experienced men, like Cyrus Vance and Paul Nitze. He had the finest group of associates of any Cabinet member, possibly ever. Second, he had been an administrator and executive for fifteen years; he could identify and address problems.

Question: What were his views on the role of the Service Secretary?

Answer: He was selected in December 1960 and took office in January 1961. The organization of the Department was anachronistic. Particularly, the role of the Service Secretary was an anachronism. He read the intent of the national security law since World War II. He built the optimal structure, staying within the law. The role of the Service Secretary was to manage the logistics, training, and requirements, but not operational matters.

Question: Did he still feel the Service Secretary was an anachronism after Paul Nitze was Secretary of the Navy?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What about the idea that the Service Secretary has an overarching, integrating view, while some of the OSD staff have narrow functional views?

Answer: That is an erroneous analysis of the position of the Service Secretary. The problem for the Service Secretary is only requirements. The defense budget must evolve from foreign policy objectives, then to the identification of threats to those objectives. Military strategy is developed to cope with the threats identified. Force requirements support the military strategy. Budgets are driven by the force requirements. The NSC and State Department determine the National Policy Objectives. Most of the process is worked by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Assistant SecDef for International Security Affairs. The Service Secretary only gets involved in the process from filling force requirements on.

Question: Did he have any views on Goldwater-Nichols?

Answer: He recognized Gen. Jones' work. It [Goldwater-Nichols] formalized what Secretary McNamara actually did.

Question: May he be quoted?

Answer: Yes. Provide a copy of the interview.

## Appendix D

### Extract from JCS Pub 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

Extract from Appendix A: Logistic Responsibilities within the Department of Defense

4. Military Departments. Secretaries of the Military Departments have the following logistic responsibilities:

- a. Exercise authority to conduct all affairs of their Departments to include recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering and maintaining forces; constructing, outfitting, and repairing military equipment; constructing, maintaining, and repairing buildings, structures, and utilities; and acquiring, managing, and disposing of real property or natural resources.
- b. Prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies for effective prosecution of war and military operations throughout the operational continuum.
- c. Maintain mobile reserve forces in a state of readiness, properly organized, trained, and equipped for employment in an emergency.
- d. Recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to combatant commands.
- e. Conduct research, develop tactics, techniques, and organization, and develop and procure weapons, equipment, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of functions assigned by the Secretary of Defense.
- f. Develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations, including the LOC, and provide administrative and logistic support for all forces and bases, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

5. Military Services. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, under their departmental Secretaries, and the Coast Guard, under the Department of Transportation in peacetime and the Department of the Navy in wartime, are responsible for the functions enumerated in DOD Directive 5100.1. They will provide procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

## Appendix E

### Other Studies of the Role of the Service Secretary

1. The most comprehensive analysis of the role of the Service Secretary was published, in 1982, by Richard J. Daleski, Vice Dean of the Faculty of the National War College: Defense Management in the 1980s: the Role of the Service Secretary.

To help the reader, an outline of the article follows:

Problems of the Service Secretary  
Eroded Legal Prerogatives  
Absence of Previous Experience  
Short Tenures  
Inadequate Staffs  
Erosion of Civilian Control

Getting the Right Person  
Job Knowledge  
Executive Skills  
Political Skills  
Willingness to Serve

Organizational Setting  
Shaping the Work Environment  
Learning the Environment  
Setting Goals  
Establishing Independence and the Confidence of the Secretary of Defense  
Secretary-Military Chief Relations  
Staff and Secretarial Effectiveness

3. After he left the office of Secretary of the Air Force under Secretary McNamara, Eugene Zuckert wrote "The Service Secretary: Has He a Useful Role?" This 1966 article is thorough, thoughtful, and informed.

4. In 1981, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army and Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy

Secretary of Defense John G. Kester wrote "Do We Need the Service Secretary?" His article has some pearls:

"to be useful, the service secretary needs to understand enough about policy, operations, and overall defense strategy to be able to converse in terms to which the secretary of defense will respond."<sup>106</sup>

"to realize their potential requires, first, able and experienced appointees, and second, clear support from the secretary of defense, on whom their effectiveness ultimately depends."<sup>107</sup>

5. Captain Paul Schratz, U.S.N. published "The Role of the Service Secretary in the National Security Organization" in 1975. His contention that Secretary McNamara changed his view of the service secretary after Paul Nitze was Secretary of the Navy is incorrect - according to Mr. McNamara. (See Appendix C.)

6. The Senate Armed Services Committee published a voluminous report of its hearings: Defense Organization: the Need for Change. The issues associated with the Service Secretary are outlined below:

1. Confusion Concerning the Roles of the Service Secretaries, caused by:
  - a. misconceptions about the roles of the Service Secretaries in the unified Department of Defense;
  - b. efforts to provide independence for the Service Secretaries from the Secretary of Defense; and
  - c. lack of consistency and specificity in statutory descriptions of Service Secretary positions.
2. Unnecessary Staff Layers and Duplication of Effort
3. Inexperienced Political Appointees and Poor Continuity in the Service Secretariats
4. Limited Utility of the Current Assignment of Service Roles and Missions and Absence of Effective Mechanisms for Change

## Endnotes

1. U.S. Senate. Defense Organization: The Need for Change. Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, Senate Print 99-86. Washington: October 16, 1985, p. 25.
2. Because of the value of primary sources, direct quotations from the men are shown in bold for emphasis, while comments of others, like biographers and reporters, are not.
3. Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management, The Army Budget: FY92/93 President's Budget, April, 1991, p. 4.
4. "The Fortune 500 Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations," Fortune, April 20, 1992, p. 220.
5. Secretary of the Army John Marsh, "Organization, Structure and Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense," Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, November 2, 1983, p. 214.
6. In 1844, Navy Secretary Abel P. Upshur and the Secretary of State were unfortunately killed by an exploding twelve-inch gun aboard the frigate *Princeton*. Secretary Upshur had excellent vision, because the advanced *Princeton* had steam power, below-the-waterline propulsion, and exploding shell guns. From Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War - A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973, p. 63.
7. In May 1861, President Lincoln was distressed at the inactivity of his military. Accompanied by the Secretary of War Stanton and Secretary of the Treasury Chase, President Lincoln visited Fort Monroe, only to find that the commander had not even attempted to take Norfolk, Virginia, or the *Virginia*, a Confederate ship, that was homeported there. President Lincoln decided to direct the operation himself. Lincoln, Stanton, and Chase personally walked the enemy's shoreline looking for a landing site for the Union troops. Secretary Chase found the location. In the face of the subsequent Union attack, the Confederate garrison blew up the *Virginia*, and abandoned Norfolk. The President and his cabinet members returned to Washington very satisfied, but the days of the Fighting Secretary were numbered. From Defense Organization: The Need for Change, p. 33, quoted from With Malice towards None, p. 326.
8. Philip Jessup, Elihu Root, Volume I, 1845-1909. Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1938, p. 3,7.



9. Ibid, p. 11.
10. Ibid, p. 15.
11. Ibid, p. 22.
12. His tenacity and thoroughness, which later contributed to his success in law, as well as his work at the Departments of War and State, were likely based on his grasp for rigorous mathematics, learned from his father, nicknamed "Cube" Root. Ibid, p. 38.
13. Ibid, p. 47.
14. Ibid, p. 62.
15. The New York Times, June 14, 1888, quoted by Jessup, p.83.
16. Jessup, p. 115.
17. Ibid, p. 116.
18. Utica Morning Gazette, June 26, 1879, quoted by Jessup, p. 116.
19. Jessup, p. 215.
20. Richard W. Leopold, Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition, Little, Brown and Company, 1954, p. 6.
21. Ibid, p. 24.
22. Ibid, p. 25.
23. Ibid, p. 38-39.
24. Ibid, p. 39.
25. Ibid, p. 39-40.
26. Elihu Root, Addresses at the Fifth Annual Convention of the Interstate National Guard Association of the United States, Columbus, Ohio, May 4, 1903. The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916, p. 145.
27. Leopold, p. 40-41.
28. Elihu Root, Addresses at the Fifth Annual Convention of the Interstate National Guard Association of the United States, Columbus, Ohio, May 4, 1903. The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916, p.

149.

29. Newton D. Baker, Century Club speech, April 27, 1937, p. 17, quoted by Jessup, p. 240.

30. Leopold, p. 21, 41.

31. Ibid, p. 42.

32. Terrence J. Gough, et al, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans 1903-1986, US Army Center for Military History, Washington, 1986, p. 4.

33. Ibid, p. 44-45.

34. Honorable Frank Pace, Jr., Senior Officer Oral History Program, Project 75-8, interviewed by LTC J. Lapsey Smith, 1975, session 1, tape 1, p. 2.

35. Ibid, p. 3.

36. Ibid, p. 6.

37. Ibid, p. 12.

38. Ibid, tape 2, p. 3.

39. Ibid, tape 1, p. 15-16.

40. Ibid, p. 24.

41. Ibid, p. 13.

42. Ibid, p. 14.

43. Ibid, p. 16.

44. Ibid, p. 16-17.

45. Ibid, p. 17-18.

46. Ibid, p. 14.

47. Ibid, p. 24.

48. Ibid, p. 24.

49. Ibid, p. 19.

50. Ibid, p. 24.

51. Ibid, Tape 1, 2d Session, p. 26.
52. Ibid, p. 30.
53. Defense Organization: the Need for Change, p. 574.
54. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War - A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973, p. 42.
55. Weigley, p. 42.
56. Weigley, p. 43-44.
57. Robert K. Mueller, former Chairman of Arthur D. Little, in telephonic interviews with Van Cunningham on 24 April 1992. Mr. Mueller serves on several corporate boards and teaches new directors.
58. Abraham Zalenik, "Managers and Leaders: Are They Different?" Harvard Business Review, March-April 1992, originally published in HBR May-June 1977, p. 131.
59. Avery S. Cohen, "Philosophy of Board Activity and Responsibility," Duties and Responsibilities of Outside Directors, New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1977, p. 369.
60. New York Stock Exchange. New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, March 1990, footnote to Section 303.00 "Audit Committee."
61. Pat E. Haggerty, "Memorandum to Members of Board of Directors of Texas Instruments," 15 December 1966, p. 4, quoted by Bryan F. Smith, "Corporate Governance - A Director's View", Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture, University of Miami School of Law, p. 11.
62. Bryan F. Smith, "Corporate Governance - A Director's View", Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture, University of Miami School of Law, p. 11. Besides serving as a General Director of Texas Instruments Inc, Mr. Smith served as a Director for: Blue Bell, Inc., Computer Language Research, Inc., Engraph Inc., French American Banking Corporation, Mary Kay Cosmetics, Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co, Inc., Preston Bank, and RSR Corp.
63. Senator Barry Goldwater, questions to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, "Organization, Structure and Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense," Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, July 28, 1983, p. 3.

64. Secretary of the Army John Marsh, "Organization, Structure and Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense," Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, November 2, 1983, p. 214.
65. Almanac, The Sentinel, Carlisle, PA, March 24, 1992, p. B7.
66. Defense Organization: the Need for Change, p. 1.
67. President Harry Truman, "Message to Congress," December 19, 1945. The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, p. 13.
68. Defense Organization: the Need for Change, p. 16.
69. Senator Barry Goldwater, questions to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, "Organization, Structure and Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense," Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, July 28, 1983, p. 3.
70. Jessup, Volume I, p. 243-249.
71. Defense Organization: the Need for Change, p. 42, quoted from the Steadman Report, p. 40.
72. Defense Organization: the Need for Change, p. 44.
73. Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 605.
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76. Secretary Michael P. W. Stone, "Report of the Secretary of the Army," Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress. Washington: Government Printing Office, January, 1990, p. 59.
77. Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, "Nomination of H. Lawrence Garrett III to be Secretary of the Navy", May 3, 1989, p. 204.

78. Zuckert, p. 472.

79. Zuckert. p. 471.

80. Paul Schratz. "The Role of the Service Secretary in the National Security Organization," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1975, p.23. Schratz's contention that Secretary McNamara changed his mind on the role of the Service Secretary after Paul Nitze was Secretary of the Navy is wrong. This author asked Secretary McNamara that question; he still felt the Service Secretary was anachronistic.

81. Schratz, p. 24.

82. Former Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert. "The Service Secretary: Has He a Useful Role?" Foreign Affairs, Vol 44, No. 3, April 1966, p. 458.

83. Paul H. Nitze. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision - A Memoir. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989, p. 253.

84. Paul H. Nitze, p. 253.

85. Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost; at the Center of Decision. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989, p. 243.

86. Eugene M. Zuckert, "The Service Secretary: Has He a Useful Role?" Foreign Affairs, Vol 44, No 3, April 1966, p. 460.

87. Schratz, p. 19.

88. Secretary of Defense, "Defense Top Management Report 1966," Armed Forces Management 13, no. 1 (October, 1966), p. 43, quoted by Bauer and Yospe, Defense Organization and Management, p. 7.

89. Richard Nixon, recommending a Secretary of the Navy. Quoted by John Kester, "Do We Need the Service Secretary?", The Washington Quarterly, Winter, 1981, p. 149, from Gulley and Reese, Breaking Cover (New York: Simon & Schuster), p. 257.

90. Schemmer, Benjamin F. "Let's Fire 18 Presidential Appointees", Armed Forces Journal International editorial, February 1975, p.4.

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92. Defense Organization: the Need for Change, p. 79.

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100. Robert S. McNamara, telephonic interview by Van Cunningham, April 23, 1992.

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102. John R. Phillips. "Rights and Responsibilities of Directors to be Informed; Rights to Special Counsel, Special Auditor," Duties and Responsibilities of Outside Directors, New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1977, p. 239.

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106. John G. Kester, "Do We Need a the Service Secretary?" p. 159.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
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25 June 1992

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MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER

SUBJECT: Replacement Page for Student Paper

1. Attached is replacement page number 53 for student paper "Great Service Secretaries -- Lessons Learned" by Mr. Van Cunningham, AD number AD-A251 132.
2. Original was forwarded to DTIC on 2 June 1992.
3. Please discard original page and use replacement for retention in DTIC system.
4. Any questions may be directed to Lillie Cramer, AV: 242-4318 or Comm: 717-245-4318. Thank you for you patience and time in this matter.

Sincerely



Karen Nickerson  
Acquisitions Librarian

CARATA AD-A 251/132

Appendix C - Corrected Copy

Record of telephonic interview: **The Honorable Robert S. McNamara**  
1455 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Ste 515, Washington, DC 20004  
(202) 347-2273 FAX: (202) 347-2315  
Time: 1102 hrs, EDT, 23 April 1992, by Van Cunningham.

Question: When he became Secretary of Defense, how was he able to "spin up," to become so effective, so quickly?

Answer: Two reasons: First, he had received a promise from President-elect Kennedy that he could man his subordinate positions with the most able people he could find, without regard for political affiliation. As a result, he recruited many very experienced men, like Cyrus Vance and Paul Nitze. He had the finest group of associates of any Cabinet member, possibly ever. Second, he had been an administrator and executive for fifteen years; he could identify and address problems.

Question: What were his views on the role of the Service Secretary?

Answer: He was selected in December 1960 and took office in January 1961. The organization of the Department was anachronistic. Particularly, the role of the Service Secretary was an anachronism. He read the intent of the national security law since World War II. He built the optimal structure, staying within the law. The role of the Service Secretary was to manage the logistics, training, and requirements, but not operational matters.

Question: Did he still feel the Service Secretary was an anachronism after Paul Nitze was Secretary of the Navy?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What about the idea that the Service Secretary has an overarching, integrating view, while some of the OSD staff have narrow functional views?

Answer: That is an erroneous analysis of the position of the Service Secretary. The responsibility of the Service Secretary is limited to logistics and training. It does not include "application of force." The defense budget must evolve from foreign policy objectives, then to the identification of threats to those objectives. Military strategy is developed to cope with the threats identified. Force requirements support the military strategy. Budgets are driven by the force requirements. The NSC and State Department determine the National Policy Objectives. Most of the process is worked by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and Systems Analysis. The Service Secretary only gets involved in the process after the determination of force requirements.

Question: Did he have any views on Goldwater-Nichols?

Answer: He recognized Gen. Jones' work. It [Goldwater-Nichols] formalized what Secretary McNamara actually did.

Question: May he be quoted?

Answer: Yes. Provide a copy of the interview.

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